C. Scotus’ own Response

121. To the question, therefore, I respond that since I concede anything in accord with a maxim known to me (which is a maxim most certain for me), I concede that ‘for God everything is possible that does not evidently include a contradiction, and on which too no necessary contradiction follows’; and this maxim is of that sort, because the reasons that lead to proving a contradiction do not seem probative, as will appear in solving the reasons [nn.138-145] - I say, therefore, that it is simply possible for God to make the same body to be located at the same time in diverse places.

122. This is plain from understanding the terms: for when I say ‘a body is placed at the same time in diverse places’ I do not say anything over and above ‘body’ save a certain externally arising respect founded on a quantum to another quantum that circumscribes it.

123. But ‘that such a respect is, on the same foundation, multiplied to diverse terms’ does not appear to be against anything known to reason, because respects that come to a thing from within, about which the point is less evident, can be multiplied on a foundation that remains the same (as on the same whiteness two likenesses can be founded to two terms, as was proved in Lectura III d.8 n.49).

124. The assumption [n.122], namely that ‘where’ only states a respect coming from outside, is sufficiently clear from what was said in the previous question [nn.35, 5455].

125. And it is a wonder that those who so much follow reason follow imagination, that because imagination does not separate place from body or conversely, nor perceives that one is multiplied without the other, therefore let it be said to be simply impossible that one is multiplied without the other, since, in following imagination, nothing else appears. But according to reason no necessity from the ideas of the terms is or appears that when one is multiplied the other is too. For when a posterior is multiplied there is no necessity for the prior to be multiplied. But the ‘wheres’ are manifestly posterior to the located quantum, and they come to a thing accidentally and contingently. In many other cases too, where there is a greater connection, we concede according to reason that one is multiplied without the other. For scarcely is any other relation more accidental to its foundation than ‘where’ is - no mode of ‘existing in’ is, nor any mode of ‘being from’, and so on about many other relations. And yet in the case of other relations there is no such impudent assertion of the impossibility of multiplying relations on the same foundation.

126. And if you object that it is true that many respects can be founded on the same foundation when one of them is not adequate to the whole foundation, but here one thing is adequate to the whole idea of a quantum insofar as a quantum is locatable in place - this seems to be said without reason, because a respect that arises from the nature of a foundation seems to be more adequate to the foundation than that respect which comes to it from without, ceteris paribus. But two such respects to two terms, respects arising from the nature of the foundation, can exist in the same foundation, as two equalities to two equal quantities; therefore, without reason is it imagined that here there is one adequate respect.

127. And there is a confirmation, because a quantity’s presenceInstead of “quantity’s presence” and “substance’s presence” the Latin ‘sua’ could mean “his [Christ’s] presence” and “his [Christ’s] substance” ¹⁰ to place is not more adequate to the quantity than a substance’s presence, a presence fitting to it, is adequate to the substance, as on altars. But no presence on the altar is adequate to the substance, because the substance of Christ’s body is posited as able to have several presences, even primarily, since it is the first term of many conversions on altars, and yet along with this his body is present in heaven under its own quantitative mode.